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SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION: FROM DERIVATIVE
SUITS TO SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS
Angel R. Oquendo'
INTRODUCTION
Transindividual litigation has revolutionized modern law. It
has radically altered the manner of assertion and adjudication of
legal claims. Beyond concerning a large number of people, the
underlying suits operate in a unique fashion. In particular, they call
for the constant protection of the interests of the parties on whose
behalf the plaintiffs purport to speak.
Not surprisingly, corporate law has partaken in this
phenomenon. For instance, derivative suits allow individuals to sue
for a larger collectivity, somewhat along the lines of the citizen suits
established over a century later. Of course, they entertain the
claims of the corporation rather than those of the society as a whole.
Likewise, stockholders have deployed the class action, since its
inception, to aggregate their claims specifically against the
corporate entity or the board of directors.
This Article will concentrate on and contrast derivate suits and
shareholder class actions. It will ultimately contend that the two
procedures resemble each other only superficially and that they
diverge from each other on a more profound level. Most
significantly, derivative suits aim at the vindication of a genuinely
collective and indivisible right, while shareholder class actions seek
to enforce an aggregation of individual entitlements. Consequently,
these mechanisms also differ in the kind of representation they
entail, in the objectives they pursue, in how they construct fairness
internally, and in how they approach the central problem of
adequacy of representation.
An appreciation of this dichotomy contributes to an
understanding not only of the inner workings of each of these two
devices but also of the corporation itself and of the relationship
among the corporate entity, the board of directors, the investors, and
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even the stakeholders. In addition, it suggests a new interpretation
of the key distinction, everpresent in the case law, between
derivative and direct corporate claims. Accordingly, in order to
distinguish the former from the latter, courts should focus first and
foremost on the nature of the right at stake, following the path
delineated in Part IV. At the end of the day, by grasping the
difference between derivative suits and shareholder class actions,
one gains invaluable insights into group rights generally.
Part I will evoke a common view according to which the two
procedures at stake coincide in their essence and differ only in their
technical details. Part II, in turn, will propose an alternative
outlook, according to which the two devices converge only formally,
yet diverge critically. Finally, drawing on this second perspective,
Parts III and IV will, respectively, recast the distinction between
derivative and direct suits and reconceptualize collective
entitlements.
I. A COMMON VIEW
On first impression, one might view derivative suits and
shareholder class actions as essentially similar. In particular, one
might regard them as collective procedures that similarly serve to
vindicate the group rights of stockholders. Accordingly, both
procedural devices allow one or several corporate investors to
litigate on behalf of the collectivity.
Someone taking this approach might maintain that these two
types of litigation similarly seek to correct managerial failure. She
might add that the judge must simply resolve a dispute as to
whether the managers indeed failed to protect the entitlements of
the shareholders. Thus construed, both procedural mechanisms
resemble each other not only in how they operate but also in what
they ultimately pursue.
From this perspective, derivative suits and shareholder class
actions enable, along parallel lines, an extraordinary alteration in
the status quo to take place. Specifically, they empower individual
investors to displace the board of directors as the speaker for
shareholders as a group, whether conceived as the corporation itself
or as a self-standing class. Ordinarily, the board possesses the
exclusive prerogative to speak for the corporate entity and to care
for the stockholders' well-being.
The relevant procedural parameters tend to reinforce this
standpoint. For instance, Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure empowers "one or more shareholders . .. to bring a
derivative action to enforce a right" of the corporation.' It explicitly
requires that the plaintiffs "fairly and adequately represent the
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a).
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interests of shareholders . . . who are similarly situated."2 Rule 23,
in turn, entitles "[o]ne or more members of a class," including a
stockholder class, to "sue . . . on behalf of all members." 3 It
expressly demands that "the representative parties . . . fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 4
Of course, Rule 23.1 zeroes in on the entitlements of the
corporation, while Rule 23 focuses, in the context of corporate law,
on the rights of the individual investors. Nonetheless, both
provisions suggest that the nominal claimants act in representation
of the interests of the shareholders. This convergence should not
come as a surprise, because, in a sense, a corporation possesses no
interests of its own other than those of its stockholders.
Consistently, both rules compel the plaintiff to secure judicial
endorsement prior to settling, voluntarily dismissing, or
compromising the claim.5 They thus evidently seek to protect the
entitlements of other, absent investors. In fact, the complainant in
a derivative suit must transmit "[n]otice of [the] proposed
settlement, voluntary dismissal or compromise ... to
shareholders ... in the manner that the court orders."6 Likewise,
the representative party in a class action must send "notice in a
reasonable manner to all class members who would.be bound by the
proposal."7
While premised on the overall convergence between the two
types of litigation, the position under consideration could easily
recognize certain undeniable "technical" dissimilarities. First,
different rules govern each of these procedures: in federal court, for
instance, Rule 23.1 applies to derivative suits and Rule 23 applies to
class actions. While these provisions overlap on the points just
discussed, they differ in many of their details.
In particular, the pleading requirements vary. In derivative
suits, for instance, plaintiffs must verify the complaint.8 In class
actions, in contrast, they need not do so.9  Nonetheless, the
claimants in a shareholder class action must "provide a sworn
certification" declaring, inter alia, that they "reviewed" the filing,
that they did not "purchase" their stock "at the direction of' their
2. Id. According to the Advisory Committee, this "sentence recognizes
that the question of adequacy of representation may arise when the plaintiff is
one of a group of shareholders or members." FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 advisory
committee's note (1966 Amendment).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b) ("The complaint must be verified . . .
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a) ("Unless a rule or statute specifically states
otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit.").
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attorney or for purposes of litigation, that they will not receive any
compensation for serving as a representative party, and whether
they have recently lodged any other class actions.10 Finally, the
plaintiff must, when suing derivatively-but not when litigating on
behalf of a class-make special allegations as to share ownership,"
the absence of "collusive" intent,12 and "any effort . .. to obtain the
desired action from the directors."' 3
Case law has interpreted this last prerequisite to mean that
complainants in a derivative suit, as opposed to a shareholder class
action, must first "exhaust[ ... intracorporate remedies."14 In other
words, the plaintiffs must request the directorial board to pursue
the claim unless they show the futility of any such demand in light
of the body's conflict of interest.15 With such a request, they
constructively concede the directors' "independence"16 and may
proceed only if they demonstrate a "wrongful refusal."'7
Courts have thus-pushed derivative suits away from the notice-
pleading model that prevails in class actions and in litigation as a
whole.'8 Indeed, they have essentially forbidden plaintiffs to lodge a
10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(2) (2006).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(1); see also DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(a); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2011).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(2).
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3); see also DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1(a).
14. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
15. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004) ("[A] stockholder may
not pursue a derivative suit to assert a claim of the corporation unless: (a) she
has first demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim and they have
wrongfully refused to do so; or (b) such demand is excused because the directors
are deemed incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the pursuit of
the litigation.").
16. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 212 (Del. 1991), overruled on other
grounds by Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
17. Id. at 200.
18. See id. at 210 ("Rule 23.1 is an exception to the general notice pleading
standard of the Rules."); see also Eisner, 746 A.2d at 254 ("Pleadings in
derivative suits are governed by Chancery Rule 23.1 . ... Those pleadings must
comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity that differ
substantially from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by Chancery
Rule 8(a). Rule 23.1 is not satisfied by conclusory statements or mere notice
pleading."). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief
must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."). According to the United States Supreme Court,
"[tihe liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified
pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). "Other provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a)'s
simplified notice pleading standard." Id. at 513. "This simplified notice
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
[Vol. 48646
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complaint that merely notifies the defendant of the claim and to
build their case through discovery. 19 When suing derivatively,
complainants must, in effect, either make their case upfront or else
face early dismissal. Specifically, they "must allege with
particularity facts raising a reasonable doubt that the corporate
action being questioned was properly the product of business
judgment."20
In contrast, litigants filing class actions and other suits need
not present "detailed factual allegations."21 All the same, they must
plead, at least in federal tribunals, "factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference" of liability.22 Certainly, this
last requirement considerably thickens the "notice" that the
defendants must receive. It does not imply, however, that the
plaintiffs must allege the facts "with particularity."
More generally, derivative suits diverge from class actions,
according to the Delaware Supreme Court, with respect to both the
locus of the injury and the beneficiary of the remedy. 23  As
previously pointed out, derivative suits stake corporate rather than
shareholder claims. Therefore, they involve harm to and relief for
the corporation. 24  Of course, the damage and the reparation
indirectly and ultimately concern the investors as the residual
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious
claims." Id. at 512.
19. See, e.g., Levine, 591 A.2d at 210 (explaining that allowing a plaintiff
whose complaint does not contain particularized allegations to conduct
discovery "would be a complete abrogation of the principles underlying the
pleading requirements of Rule 23.1").
20. Eisner, 746 A.2d at 254-255.
21. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court held that "the pleading standard Rule
8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
22. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The claim must have "facial plausibility," in the
sense that "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Id.
23. Derivative suits differ not only from shareholder class actions but also
from direct actions in general, as far as "(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the
corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive
the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders,
individually." Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031,
1033 (Del. 2004). See also Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1264-
65 (Del. 2012).
24. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The derivative
action . . . is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its
behalf, against those liable to it."), overruled on other grounds by Eisner, 746
A.2d 244.
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owners. Shareholder direct actions, for their part, concentrate from
the outset on injuries to and on remedies for the stockholders.25
II. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
Against the common view just delineated, an alternative
conception suggests itself. In fact, it leads to a diametrically
opposed approach. From this perspective, as explained and
defended in this Part, derivative suits and shareholder class actions
converge formally but diverge critically.
On the formal front, both procedures unfold collectively. More
precisely, they operate transindividually insofar as they do not
concern an individual but rather a larger group. 26 Hence, derivative
suits deal with the entitlements of the corporation, not of the
complainant. Likewise, shareholder class actions involve the rights
of all stockholders, not just those of the party pursuing the
litigation.
Secondly, the two types of litigation involve representation. The
nominal claimants generally vindicate the entitlements of others. In
particular, they represent the corporation in derivative suits and
large numbers of corporate investors in shareholder class actions. 27
Thirdly, both procedural mechanisms coincide formally on the
instrumental objective of resolving a dispute between stockholders
and directors.28 They also overlap in terms of their reflexive or
intrinsic aim, which consists in allowing investors and managers to
interact throughout the proceedings in terms of fairness.29 Of
course, the litigation itself usually becomes an important part of,
and therefore colors, the entire relationship between these actors.
Finally, the two procedural devices confront the same primary
challenge. In other words, they must guarantee adequacy of
representation. The plaintiffs must clearly and consistently show
25. See infra Part III.
26. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
27. See supra notes 1, 3, 24 and accompanying text.
28. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(a) ("This rule applies when one or more
shareholders or members of a corporation . . . bring a derivative action to
enforce a right that the corporation . . . may properly assert but has failed to
enforce."); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 Amendment)
("[A]ctions by shareholders to compel the declaration of a dividend[,] the proper
recognition and handling of redemption or pre-emption rights, or the like ...
should ordinarily be conducted as class actions . . .
29. See Angel R. Oquendo, The Comparative and the Critical Perspective in
International Agreements, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 205, 208 (1997) ("[Contrary
to an] exclusively instrumental view, according to which procedure is taken to
serve particular ends,... a reflexive conception . .. regards procedure as having
intrinsic value. The value of procedure [is] thus ... a function of not only the
objectives advanced but also the internal constitution of procedure, e.g., how it
processes the arguments made, how it treats the various actors, what kind of
power relations it supports.").
648 [Vol. 48
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that they are adequately representing the relevant group, whether
the corporation or the class of stockholders. 30
Despite converging from a formal standpoint, these procedures
diverge at a more fundamental level. Actually, the referenced points
of convergence reveal themselves as points of divergence upon
deeper inspection. As the United States Supreme Court declared in
its 1881 opinion in Hawes v. Oakland,31 a derivative suit "is a very
different affair from a controversy between the shareholder of a
corporation and that corporation itself, or its managing directors or
trustees, or the other shareholders, who may be violating his rights
or destroying the property in which he has an interest."32 The
disparity does not disappear when the comparison involves, on the
other hand, a complaint filed not by one stockholder but rather by a
multiplicity thereof.
A. Collective Litigation
First, the two types of litigation indeed proceed collectively but
in quite dissimilar ways. Derivative suits are genuinely collective
because they involve a collectivity (i.e. the corporation as the real
party in interest, as well as its rights).33 In contrast, shareholder
class actions paradigmatically aggregate numerous individual
claims. Consequently, they concern individuals and unfold
collectively only inasmuch as they affect the entitlements of an
aggregation of parties instead of those of a single person or entity. 34
"In law," as the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed, "the
30. See supra notes 1, 2, 4 and accompanying text.
31. 104 U.S. 450 (1882), abrogated by Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
500 U.S. 90 (1991).
32. Id. at 454.
33. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981)
("Derivative suits enforce corporate rights and any recovery obtained goes to the
corporation.").
34. Some commentators have proposed treating the class as an entity for
practical reasons. For instance, Edward Cooper contends that doing so "may
help to sharpen the focus on class-as-client, speaking through one set of agents
to another." Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 16 (1996). He maintains that this approach would
additionally enable courts to decide, in a more clearheaded fashion, issues of
mootness, counsel conflict of interest, jurisdiction, due process, choice of law,
adequacy of settlement, and preclusion. Id. at 28-29; see also David L. Shapiro,
Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917
(1998) (arguing that the class action "should be viewed as not involving the
claimants as a number of individuals, or even as an 'aggregation' of individuals,
but rather as an entity in itself for the critical purposes of determining the
nature of the lawsuit").
2013] 649
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corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are not
the same thing. . . ."35
Of course, the corporation has no life of its own. Its interests
often boil down to those of the investors, who residually and
ultimately own the entity. Therefore, a complaint on behalf of the
corporation may not differ much from a complaint in the name of
each one of the stockholders.
Nonetheless, the corporation normally also embodies the
interest of many stakeholders, such as its creditors, its employees,
its suppliers, or the communities in which it operates. 36 Ideally, a
derivative suit should take into account these "other"
constituencies.3 7 Even a close corporation, in which the stockholders
play most or all of these stakeholder roles, does not amount to the
sum of its investors. It possesses a separate legal identity, bears
liability to the extent of its own assets, and holds its own set of
rights.
In these respects, a corporation differs from a traditional
partnership. Contrary to the former, the latter legally constitutes
nothing but an aggregation of its members. 38 It has no legal
personality, property, or entitlements of its own, as opposed to those
of its partners. 39 As a result, a suit on behalf of such an association
35. Hawes, 104 U.S. at 455 (1881) (quoting Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare
461).
36. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (2013) ("[The directors]
may ... consider ... [t]he effects of any action upon any or all groups affected
by such action, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and
creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-
756(d)(3)-(4) (2012) ("[A] director of a corporation ... shall consider . .. the
interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, [as
well as] community and societal considerations including those of any
community in which any office or other facility of the corporation is located.");
see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders."); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) ("[The] directors [must analyze] the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: ...
the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally) . . . .").
37. Since a plaintiff in a derivative suit stands in for the directors, she
should inherit their authority or obligation to consider these stakeholders. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
38. See Grand Grove of United Ancient Order of Druids v. Garibaldi Grove,
62 P. 486, 487 (1900) ("[Unincorporated associations are not] recognized by the
law as persons. They are mere aggregates of individuals called for convenience,
like partnerships, by a common name.").
39. See id. ("Such [associations] cannot, therefore, acquire or hold
property .... All the property said to belong to it is in fact the property of its
members and each man's share of it is his own private property.").
650 [Vol. 48
DERIVATIVE SUITS & CLASS ACTIONS
essentially corresponds to an action in the name of its various
associates. 40
Certainly, a traditional partnership does come across as a
collectivity, despite lacking legal recognition as such. Somewhat
like a corporation, it seems to possess not only an identity apart
from that of its members but also its own rights. Not surprisingly,
the law has progressed toward conceiving partnerships in these
terms. 41
In any event, a corporation, like a modern partnership,
constitutes an entity separate from the individuals that form and
fund it. It amounts to a distinct collectivity composed of investors
and dressed in corporate form. Whether bare or attired as a
corporation, this collective body differs from the aggregation of its
constituents.
To be sure, class actions sometimes operate like suits on behalf
of a collectivity, not an aggregation of individuals. They do so
particularly under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), when
"the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class
as a whole." 4 2 For example, a school desegregation suit ordinarily
seeks to enforce the entitlements not of the individual students but
rather of the excluded racial or ethnic group. 43
Undoubtedly, a shareholder class ordinarily lacks the
cohesiveness and the permanence of a racial or ethnic class.
Therefore, the former normally does not constitute a collectivity in
the same sense as the latter. Moreover, even in a shareholder class
action for equitable relief under Rule 23(b)(2), the stockholders do
40. See id. ("For the same reason such associations cannot sue or be sued.
In suits where they are apparently parties, the real parties are the members of
the association, who-as in the case of partnerships-are sued by the company
name.").
41. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 6(1) (1914) ("A partnership is an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."); id. § 8(1)
("All property originally brought into the partnership stock or subsequently
acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership, is partnership
property."); id. § 8(2) ("Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired
with partnership funds is partnership property."); UNIF. P'SHIP AcT § 101(6)
(1997) ('Partnership' means an association of two or more persons to carry on
as co-owners a business for profit . . . ."); id. § 201(a) ("A partnership is an entity
distinct from its partners."); id. § 203 ("Property acquired by a partnership is
property of the partnership and not of the partners individually.").
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment)
("Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is
charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose
members are incapable of specific enumeration.").
2013]1 651
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not usually litigate as a cohesive group but instead as a sizeable
number of individuals with separate and interrelated claims.44
Nonetheless, a 23(b)(2) shareholder class action could seek an
injunction against corporate measures that injure stockholders as a
group rather than individually. For instance, it might allege that
the board arbitrarily revoked a long-established written
commitment to distribute dividends regularly to all investors. Such
a suit would resemble the previously cited controversy over racial
discrimination in education in that it would concern a collectivity as
the real party in interest. Class members could not point to an
entitlement that they possessed, to an injury that they endured, or
to a remedy that they could request, independent of and distinct
from that of their peers.
In fact, these specific shareholder class actions operate
collectively somewhat along the lines of derivative suits. They also
involve a claim that pertains to stockholders as a group.
Nonetheless, the real party in interest is the investor community in
its naked state, so to speak, rather than in the garb of a corporation.
All the same, shareholder class actions typically proceed under
Rules 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(3), not under Rule 23(b)(2).45 On the one
hand, they may involve cases in which, as expressed in Rule
23(b)(1), "prosecuting separate actions ... would create a risk of:
44. See, e.g., In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., 59 A.3d 418, 433 (Del. 2012)
(explaining that, in a suit on behalf of a large number of stockholders,
"certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is appropriate when the rights and interests of
the class members are homogeneous. A Rule 23(b)(2) class may seek monetary
damages in addition to declaratory or injunctive relief, so long as the claim for
equitable relief predominants [sic]").
45. For purposes of this Article, Lauren Kinell conducted a survey on
Westlaw of United States District Court decisions certifying shareholder class
actions for a twelve-month period starting on June 2, 2012. She found that
certification always took place either under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(3). See Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 427 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2013)
(certifying a class of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)); In re Winstar Commc'ns
Sec. Litig., No. 01 CIV. 3014, 2013 WL 1700993, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013)
(certifying a class of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)); In re Smith Barney
Transfer Agent Litig., 290 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013) (certifying a
class of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)); In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. 05-1151 & 05-2367, 2013 WL 396117, at *1
(D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2013) (certifying a class of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)); In
re Smart Techs, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 11 CIV. 7673 KBF, 2013 WL 139559, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013) (certifying a class of shareholders under Rule
23(b)(3)); Katz v. China Century Dragon Media, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 575, 583 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (certifying a class of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)); Vinh Nguyen
v. Radient Pharm. Corp., 287 F.R.D. 563, 575 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying a class
of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)); Davis v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., No.
5:11-CV-181, 2012 WL 4471226, at *6--7 (D. Vt. Sept. 27, 2012) (certifying class
of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(1)); In re Schering-Plough Corp./ENHANCE
Sec. Litig., No. 8-397, 2012 WL 4482032, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012) (certifying
a class of shareholders under Rule 23(b)(3)).
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(A) . . . incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class; or (B) adjudications . . . that, as a practical matter, would ...
impair [the] ability [of other members] to protect their interests."46
On the other hand, shareholder class actions may address situations
in which, as phrased in Rule 23(b)(3), "questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members ... and ... a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy." 47
The Advisory Committee on the key 1966 Amendments to Rule
23 mentioned the possibility of processing "actions by shareholders
to compel the declaration of a dividend[,J the proper recognition and
handling of redemption or pre-emption rights, or the like" under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B).48 To be sure, it also cautioned that "the matter has
been much obscured by the insistence that each shareholder has an
individual claim." 49 Nonetheless, the committee was presumably
not denying "that each shareholder has an individual claim."5 0 It
evidently thought that the "insistence"51 on this point obfuscated the
fact that these suits "should ordinarily be conducted as class
actions,"52 inasmuch as stockholders litigating subsequently would,
in the words of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), have "their ability to protect their
interests" 5 3 impaired "as a practical matter."54 Significantly, the
committee distinguished such "shareholders' actions . . . from
derivative actions by shareholders dealt with in .. . Rule 23.1."55
Beyond the scenarios discussed in the previous paragraph,
shareholder class actions mostly call for certification under the
catchall Rule 23(b)(3).56 After all, they aggregate a multiplicity of
discrete claims. The judiciary could adjudicate the case
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment)
(discussing Subdivision (b)(1); Clause (B)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
54. Id.
55. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment)
(discussing Subdivision (b)(1); Clause (B)).
56. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A
Case Study of Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 559, 564 n.22 (1996) ("Shareholder class actions are most often certified
under Rule 23(b)(3). . . ."). Based on Lauren Kinell's survey, class certification
took place under Rule 23(b)(3) in eight out of nine United States District Court
cases during a twelve-month period starting on June 2, 2012. See supra note
45.
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satisfactorily through "separate actions,"5 7 yet it could do so more
effectively through a single class action.
In sum, plaintiffs in these and in most other shareholder class
actions do not engage in collective litigation in the same manner as
their counterparts in derivative suits. The latter seek to vindicate
the rights of a true collectivity, to wit, the corporation. The former,
for their part, purport to enforce the entitlements of an
agglomeration of individual investors.
Indeed, derivative suits relate to shareholder class actions in
this respect as citizen suits do to ordinary class actions. In
derivative and citizen suits, the real party in interest is a
collectivity: the corporation and society as a whole, respectively. In
shareholder and ordinary class actions, that party is an aggregation
of individuals.
As an illustration, a citizen may litigate on behalf of the
community at large against a pharmaceutical company that is
allegedly contaminating the air and thus the communal quality of
life. She may alternatively sue the same defendant in her own
name and in the name of the many others whose property has
similarly lost value due to the pollution. The first action would
recall a derivative suit in that it concerns the indivisible
entitlements of a collectivity. The second suit, however, would
resemble a shareholder class action in that it turns on the discrete
rights of an outsize number of people.
Of course, societies and corporations ultimately consist of their
citizens and stockholders, respectively. Moreover, one could assess
the value of any asset or any entitlement of either of these
collectivities, divide it by the number of constituents, and thus
translate any collective claim on it into a multiplicity of individual
claims. Nonetheless, such a complex operation would underscore,
rather than cast doubt upon, the significance of the distinction
between the collective and the individual. At the end of the day, it
would lend some support to the notion that people constitute
unprecedented, and only artificially translatable, group rights when
they build a nation and that individual investors do the same when
they form a corporate entity.
B. The Nature of the Representation
The second formal point of similarity between derivative suits
and shareholder class actions, to wit, their representative character,
also exposes itself as a point of dissimilarity upon deeper inspection.
In particular, these two procedural mechanisms differ in the kind of
representation they entail. In derivative suits, the plaintiffs
represent a party other than themselves and to whom they relate as
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
654 [Vol. 48
DERIVATIVE SUITS & CLASS ACTIONS
investors.5 8 In shareholder class actions, they represent themselves
along with other, similarly positioned stockholders.5 9
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 might generate some
confusion on this front with the following assertion: "The derivative
action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not
fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders or
members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the
corporation or association."60 This provision appears to insinuate
that the complainant in derivative suits as well as in class actions
acts as the representative of other, equally entitled stockholders.
The history of derivative suits may help explain this
requirement of adequate representation of similarly positioned
investors.
Historically, the derivative suit was conceived of as a double
suit, or two suits in one: The plaintiff (1) brought a suit in
equity against the corporation seeking an order compelling it
(2) to bring a suit for damages or other relief against some
third person who had caused legal injury to the corporation.61
In the first suit, the plaintiff represented herself and other
stockholders in an attempt to compel the corporation to take action.
She therefore had to play her representative role adequately with
respect to her fellow investors. In the second suit, the actual
derivative action, the complainant undertook the representation of
the corporate entity and assumed no duties vis-A-vis other
stockholders.
Presently, the two actions unfold together as one. According to
the Delaware Supreme Court, a derivative suit consists of two
phases: "the stockholder's suit to compel the corporation to sue and
the corporation's suit."6 2 In other words, "[tlhe nature of the action
is two-fold. First, it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to
compel the corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by the
corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against
those liable to it."63 Therefore, the plaintiff represents, on the one
hand, the shareholders as a whole in demanding a suit and on the
other hand, the corporation when she actually files the action.
58. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(a).
61. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 639-40 (1986).
62. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).
63. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324
A.2d 215, 218 (Del. Ch.1974) ("The nature of the derivative suit is twofold: first,
it is the equivalent of a suit by the stockholders to compel the corporation to
sue; and second, it is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the stockholders in
its behalf, against those liable to it.").
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In the first stage, the complainant acts on behalf of stockholders
as a group, not of individual investors. She plays a role analogous to
that of someone who lodges a 23(b)(2) class action for an injunction
against segregation in elementary schools. In both scenarios, the
collectivity holds the right, not its members individually. The
requirement in derivative suits that the plaintiff "fairly and
adequately represent the interests of shareholders . .. who are
similarly situated"64 may blur, but does not actually alter, this fact.
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on class actions speaks more
clearly of fair and adequate representation of "the interests of the
class."65
In fact, the first phase amounts to a genuinely collective class
action, like many of those processed under Rule 23(b)(2). In other
words, the plaintiffs represent themselves and all of their fellow
stockholders, not as an aggregation of individuals but instead as a
community. Consequently, they assert a claim that belongs to the
group as a whole and that allows no apportionment among the
various investors.
Once again, citizen suits and ordinary class actions help
illustrate the divergence at issue in this subsection. The former,
like derivative suits, entail representation of a separate entity,
which counts the plaintiff as one of its many constituents. The
latter, like shareholder class actions, involve a complainant who
represents herself in addition to a multiplicity of similarly
positioned individual classmembers.
Accordingly, the plaintiff in the environmental citizen suit
evoked earlier acts in representation of the society in its entirety.
She does not really represent similarly situated fellow citizens or
rather represents them only as a collectivity. In contrast, the
complainant in the parallel class action does litigate on behalf of the
landowners whose property, like hers, lost value due to the
pollution.
C. Instrumental and Reflexive Procedural Aims
With respect to the third point of comparison, namely the
underlying aim, derivative suits differ from shareholder class
actions in that they instrumentally pursue, beyond the settlement of
a dispute between stockholders and directors, the structural reform
of the corporation.66 In particular, they seek to alter the power
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
66. See, e.g., Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An
Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & IVIARY L. REV. 1749, 1754 (2010) (explaining that
derivative suits more often lead to "reform [in] corporate governance practices"
through settlement rather than to "meaningful financial benefit" to the
corporation).
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structure in order to grant investors more of a say in corporate
decision making, at least with respect to the derivatively asserted
claims.67 More generally, the introduction of derivative litigation
constitutes a considerable shift of control from the directors back to
the stockholders.
In this sense, derivative suits tend not only to distance
themselves from shareholder class actions but also to come closer to
public law litigation.68 For instance, they focus, along the lines of
the latter and in contrast to the former, on creating a completely
new state of affairs rather than on reestablishing the status quo
ante.69 Upon a favorable judgment, stockholders as a collectivity
end up making the contested decision to sue and augmenting their
influence within the corporation.
Furthermore, derivative suits, like public law litigation and as
opposed to shareholder class actions, aim at structurally injunctive,
as well as compensatory, relief.70 They purport to compel the
corporation to assert the claim at stake and not simply to secure the
unclaimed reparation.7' As previously suggested, shareholder class
67. See Bryant G. Garth et al., Empirical Research and the Shareholder
Derivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137, 158 (1985) (explaining that in derivative suits, the "real question is about
controlling economic power," and therefore, "the derivative suit represents a
complex social institution that helps regulate power conflicts"). See also Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) ("This remedy born of
stockholder helplessness was long the chief regulator of corporate management
and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of
stockholders' interests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it
there would be little practical check on such abuses.").
68. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing the necessity of judicial
involvement in public law litigation in an increasingly regulated society); Owen
M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21
(1996) (explaining that civil class actions can serve a public as well as a private
purpose); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication,
6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (discussing the role of adjudication in enforcing
constitutional values).
69. See Erickson, supra note 66.
70. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 88 (Del. 2001)
("[Plaintiff] filed ... [the] action ... to enjoin the consummation of a
merger. . . ."); MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 785 A.2d 625, 629
(Del. 2001) ("[P]laintiffs ... filed an amended complaint seeking preliminary
injunctive relief against consummation of the Tender Offer."). See also Stephen
P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:
Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 146 (2007) ("The derivative lawsuit might serve its
purpose by publicizing the firm's agency problems, thus leading the firm to
institute governance changes not directly captured in the litigation process.").
71. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981).
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actions may indeed seek an equitable remedy, yet they normally do
not call for significant interference in the board's exercise of
authority.
Finally, judges usually become more profoundly engaged in
derivative and public law suits than in shareholder class actions.
Indeed, they must go beyond protecting the interests of absent class
members in order to make sure that they do justice to the
stockholders as a group and to the corporation itself. In a derivative
suit, the ultimate judgment must strike a delicate balance among
the interests of investors, directors, and stakeholders.72  In an
ordinary shareholder class action, however, the judiciary must
simply assess whether the corporation has encroached upon the
stockholders' entitlements and how best to distribute the
compensation in case of liability.73
Of course, derivative suits and shareholder class actions equally
entail complex litigation. Therefore, they both demand considerable
judicial engagement, which the law defines in almost identical
terms. On the one hand, the "court has inherent power to provide
for the conduct of the proceedings in a derivative action, including
the power to determine the course of the proceedings and require
that any appropriate notice be given to shareholders or members." 74
On the other hand, in "conducting [a class] action, the court may
issue orders that (A) determine the course of proceedings or
prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in
presenting evidence or argument [or that] (B) require-to protect
class members and fairly conduct the action-giving appropriate
notice to some or all class members .... "
72. See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788 (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp.
274, 285 (1980)) ("[W~e recognize that 'the final substantive judgment whether a
particular [derivative] lawsuit should be maintained requires a balance of many
factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations,
fiscal as well as legal."').
73. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "provides that all class
actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments including those
whom the court finds to be members of the class .. . and refers to the measures
which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions." FED. R. Civ. P.
23 advisory committee's note (1966 Amendment). The tribunal must adjudicate
on "the claims . .. of the representative parties," as well as on "the claims ... of
the class." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). In addition, in the distribution any damages
awarded, it must assure a fair and adequate protection of "the interests of the
class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), (g)(1)(B). See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 159, 165-166 (1974) (explaining that "[in] a class action on behalf
of ... odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange, . . . the [trial] court
dealt with problems of the computation of damages, the mechanics of
administering [the] suit as a class action, and the distribution of any eventual
recovery.").
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment).
75. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (d)(1)(A), (B).
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Nonetheless, derivative suits differ from shareholder class
actions in that they impose on the tribunal a qualitative, rather
than a quantitative, challenge. In particular, they call on the
judiciary to adjudicate a qualitatively extraordinary claim, not
simply to entertain a sizeable quantity of standard claims at once.
The judge must rule, extraordinarily, on the appropriateness of
allowing the complainants to displace the board of directors, as well
as, rather ordinarily, on whether the corporation should prevail on
the merits. In each one of her determinations along the way, she
must draw on the entire procedural apparatus at her disposal in
order to consider the perspectives of the stockholder plaintiffs, the
managers, the experts, and the stakeholders and to promote the
company's well-being. In fact, the directors may at any point, and
repeatedly prior to trial, present an independent committee
determination that the litigation no longer serves the interests of
the corporation and move for dismissal.76
This entire discussion suggests that the two procedural
mechanisms differ in their reflexive aim as well as in their
instrumental objective. Derivative suits, in contradistinction to
shareholder class actions, aspire to enable stockholders, not as
individuals but as a collective unit, to relate to management
throughout the proceedings and beyond in fair and equitable terms.
Once again, the configuration of this relationship in court will bear
upon how these and other groups interact with each other after the
litigation.
D. Adequacy of Representation
Regarding the fourth and last comparative angle, the problem of
adequacy of representation manifests itself differently in the context
of these two procedural devices. In shareholder class actions, the
court must safeguard the due process rights of absent class
members. In derivative suits, it must also exert itself to preserve
the autonomy of the collectivity.
As previously noted, the corporation, rather than any of the
stockholders, constitutes the real party in interest in derivative
suits. It participates in the proceedings as a defendant and
therefore does not ordinarily risk a violation of its procedural
entitlements or a systematic disregard of its point of view.77
76. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788 ("After an objective and thorough investigation
of a derivative suit, an independent committee may cause its corporation to file
a pretrial motion to dismiss in the Court of Chancery. The basis of the motion
is the best interests of the corporation, as determined by the committee. The
motion should include a thorough written record of the investigation and its
findings and recommendations.").
77. See, e.g., Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213 (E.D.
Ill. 1975) ("A derivative suit is, in legal effect, a suit brought by the corporation,
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Nonetheless, this type of litigation entails the displacement and,
potentially, the sterilization of the board of directors. Hence, it may
undermine the investors' collective effort to govern the corporation
through such representative body.
Once again, citizen suits and ordinary class actions present an
analogous contrast. The former, contrary to the latter, do not call
for the protection of the rights of the members of the collectivity.
Rather, they demand the prevention of any destabilization of the
political branches of government.
In the example evoked earlier, the plaintiff does not expose the
entitlements of any of her fellow citizens by asserting the
community's environmental claims against the pharmaceutical
company. Even so, she may hamper the authorities' engagement on
the same front. For instance, the state may have already initiated
litigation on the same matter or may have decided to abstain from
doing so in light of the defendant's voluntary undertakings to solve
the problem.
Similarly, a stockholder does not impinge upon the rights of her
peers when she pursues a claim against one of the corporation's
debtors. Nevertheless, she may frustrate corporate endeavors to
address the issue. The directorate may have already filed a prior
identical complaint or may have refrained from such a course of
action in the expectation of obtaining some other benefit from the
alleged violator.
All too often, however, the judiciary has approached these
issues too narrowly in corporate controversies. It has assumed that
stockholders as a group should exercise their self-determination
exclusively through the board.78 As a result, the case law authorizes
but conducted by the shareholders. The corporation [is] formally aligned as a
defendant for historical reasons. . . ."); Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 281 (Del.
1927) ("[A] stockholder may sue in his own name for the purpose of enforcing
corporate rights, though the corporation in question is nominally a party
defendant.").
78. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) ("The directors of a
corporation and not its shareholders manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, ... and accordingly, the directors are responsible for deciding
whether to engage in derivative litigation."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000) ("The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of ...
managerial prerogatives.. .. It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.... Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by
the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish
facts rebutting the presumption."); Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759,
762 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The sound business judgment rule . . . expresses the
unanimous decision of American courts to eschew intervention in corporate
decision-making if the judgment of directors and officers in [sic] uninfluenced by
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derivative suits only when the directors have hopelessly
compromised themselves.79
Ideally, the law should shift from a representative to a
participatory conception of shareholder democracy. It should
appreciate, accordingly, that investors participate in corporate
decision making not only through their vote but also through other
means, such as shareholder inspections, shareholder proposals, and
derivative suits. When suing derivatively, plaintiffs should not have
to allege with particularity in the complaint a conflict of interest or
wrongful refusal. Moreover, they should have the right to minimal
process when they initially ask the corporation to assert the
contested claim. In other words, the law should entitle the
stockholders who are pushing for litigation to a corporate written
response and, if they make a facially meritorious case on paper, to a
face-to-face meeting with corporate officials.
In all likelihood, however, tribunals will continue to reject this
approach mostly out of a somewhat speculative concern with the
prospect of an increase in the number of filings. They will probably
persist in requiring stockholders to make a demand on the board,80
in construing such a request as a concession of independence, 81 in
allowing the corporation to refuse without any kind of hearing,82 and
in compelling plaintiffs to show the wrongness of such refusal
during the pleadings. 83 Hence, derivative suits will most certainly
not develop in the near future their full potential as a vehicle for the
empowerment of stockholders as a collectivity.
Of course, derivative litigation may thwart the directorate's
work. "By its very nature the derivative action impinges on the
managerial freedom of directors."84 As a result, it may hinder the
personal considerations and is exercised in good faith."). See generally James D.
Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A
Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 972 ("[C]ommercial
considerations ... justify the overwhelming deference courts accord director
decisions in normal commercial transactions . . . .").
79. See supra notes 14-17, 78 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
81. See Levine, 591 A,2d at 212 ("A shareholder plaintiff, by making
demand upon a board before filing suit . . . tacitly concedes lack of self-interest
and independence of a majority of the [B]oard . . . .").
82. See id. at 214 ("While a board of directors has a duty to act on an
informed basis in responding to a demand... there is obviously no prescribed
procedure that a board must follow.").
83. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Del. 2004) ("[T]he
directors are entitled to a presumption that they were faithful to their fiduciary
duties. In the context of presuit demand, the burden is upon the plaintiff in a
derivative action to overcome that presumption.").
84. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
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investors' exercise of self-determination through their regular
representatives.
Naturally, the judiciary must keep such danger in mind and at
bay. Consequently, it must painstakingly probe into whether the
litigation might undercut the autonomy of stockholders as a
collectivity. At the end of the day, the recommended approach may
or may not increase the number of suits, yet it will center on what
matters, namely, the preservation of shareholder self-determination,
rather than on intrinsically irrelevant issues, such as whether the
complaint particularizes self-dealing by the directors.
All the same, courts should acknowledge that stockholders
embark upon an alternative, and potentially constructive, kind of
democratic engagement when they sue derivatively. In fact,
derivative suits constitute, in a formulation by Robert Clark
repeatedly quoted by the Delaware Supreme Court, "one of the most
interesting and ingenious of accountability mechanisms for large
formal organizations." 85  Hence, judges should reasonably
accommodate derivative litigation instead of limiting it to clear
cases of directorial partiality.
Part IV will revisit these matters. In the end, it will propose
that derivative suits follow the lead of citizen suits and entitle the
plaintiffs to proceed even when the collectivity's legitimate
representatives show disinterestedness on the issue at hand. Under
this proposition, the directors would hold the right to (1) receive
notice of the complaint and of any settlement, (2) stake the claim
themselves, and (3) stop the litigation by demonstrating that it
would either harm the corporation or jeopardize the collective
autonomy of the investors.
III. DISTINGUISHING DERIVATIVE AND DIRECT SUITS
The approach discussed in Part II facilitates understanding
derivative suits and shareholder class actions. The former
essentially entail the vindication of an authentically collective right.
The latter involve, basically, the enforcement of an aggregation of
individual entitlements.
At the same time, this vantage point would help the judiciary to
distinguish the two procedures. When tracing this distinction in a
concrete controversy, courts would focus on the nature of the right
that the plaintiff is seeking to vindicate. They would ask whether
such entitlement is collective or individual. Thereafter, the analysis
85. CLARK, supra note 61, at 639 (cited in Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault,
51 A.3d 1213, 1264 (Del. 2012); Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc.,
845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004); Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 351
(Del. 1987)).
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would proceed to consider who suffered the injury and who would
benefit from the redress.
To be sure, most of these controversies do not present
themselves as shareholder class actions. The complainant usually
purports to represent herself only, not a sizeable number of
stockholders.86 The defendants, for their part, normally strive to
categorize the suit as derivative in order to saddle their adversary
with onerous pleading prerequisites. 87
These more common disputes present an even starker contrast
between the collective and the individual. After all, the tribunal
faces a dichotomy between derivative and individual suits,8 8 not
between derivative suits and shareholder class actions. It does not
have to interpret an aggregative class action as ultimately
individual.
At any rate, the Delaware Supreme Court has striven to
differentiate derivative and direct suits as clearly and as simply as
possible.89 In Tooley v Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,90 it
actually confronted "a purported class action"91 and went on to
characterize "some concepts in [its] prior jurisprudence" as "not
helpful and . . . erroneous."92 The justices thereupon "set forth . . .
the law to be applied . .. in determining whether a stockholder's
claim is derivative or direct."93 "That issue," they proclaimed, "must
turn solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged
harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and
86. Compare Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 729 (Del. 2008) ("[Plaintiffl
contends that his claim ... was an individual one and not derivative in
nature."), with Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033 ("Plaintiff-stockholders brought a
purported class action in the Court of Chancery . . . .").
87. See, e.g., Feldman, 951 A.2d at 730 ("[T]he defendants moved to dismiss
[plaintiffs] complaint .... The motion to dismiss asserted that [plaintiff] had
lost standing to pursue derivative claims . . . ."); Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033 ("The
Court of Chancery granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the sole ground
that the claims were .. . claims of the corporation being asserted derivatively.
They were, thus, held not to be direct. . . .").
88. See Ams. Mining Corp., 51 A.3d at 1264 ("[A] stockholder who is
directly injured retains the right to bring an individual action for those injuries
affecting his or her legal rights as a stockholder. Such an individual injury is
distinct from an injury to the corporation alone."); Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036 ("A
stockholder who is directly injured [has] the right to bring an individual action
for injuries affecting his or her legal rights as a stockholder. Such a claim is
distinct from an injury caused to the corporation alone. In such individual
suits, the recovery or other relief flows directly to the stockholders.").
89. See Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036 ("Therefore, it is necessary that a standard
to distinguish such actions be clear, simple and consistently articulated and
applied by our courts.").
90. 845 A.2d 1031.
91. Id. at 1033.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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(2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?"94
The tribunal further elaborated on its test:
That is, a court should look to the nature of the wrong and to
whom the relief should go. The stockholder's claimed direct
injury must be independent of any alleged injury to the
corporation. The stockholder must demonstrate that the duty
breached was owed to the stockholder and that he or she can
prevail without showing an injury to the corporation. 95
Consequently, a suit qualifies as derivative, as opposed to direct, if
the corporation, rather than the stockholders, not only has endured
the damage but also would stand to gain from the reparation. In a
direct action, plaintiffs must show harm to them independent of any
harm to the corporate entity.
The Delaware Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed this
2004 "landmark decision." 96  In Americas Mining Corp. v.
Theriault,97 the tribunal accordingly distinguished a derivative suit
from "a class action [on behalf of] minority stockholders only."98
"Because a derivative suit is . . . brought on behalf of the
corporation," the justices underscored, "any recovery must go to the
corporation."99
The Tooley standard zeroes in on two crucial elements for the
classification of a particular action as derivative or direct: the locus
of the injury and the beneficiary of the remedy.100 It should have
added, and actually started with, the key factor: the kind of right
invoked. In this respect, the inquiry boils down to whether the
claimant is seeking to vindicate collective or individual entitlements.
In fact, Tooley does allude to this issue. The court notes in its
elucidation that the complainant in a direct action "must
demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder."o10
Of course, a duty ordinarily correlates with a right. Therefore, the
demonstration that the defendants encroached upon an individual
duty fundamentally amounts to a showing that they infringed upon
an individual entitlement.
Maybe the Delaware Supreme Court did not proceed to include
the nature of the right in the test because it believed that doing so
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1039.
96. Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 729 (Del. 2008); see also Ams. Mining
Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1264-65 (Del. 2012); Brooks-McCollum v.
Emerald Ridge Bd. of Dirs., No. 104, 2011, slip op. at 5 (Del. Oct. 5, 2011).
97. 51 A.3d 1213
98. Ams. Mining Corp., 51 A.3d at 1265.
99. Id. at 1264.
100. See Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1033.
101. Id. at 1039.
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would entail circular reasoning. Specifically, it may have thought
that it was trying to define the entitlement at hand. Had the
justices faced such a task, they indeed would have had every logical
reason to refuse to list the entitlement's definition as one of the
considerations.
Nonetheless, the tribunal confronted the challenge of defining
the claim, not the right. Thereupon, it should have perceived the
former concept as broader than and inclusive of the latter. A claim
commonly encompasses an alleged right, injury, and remedy. The
claimant must point to the harm suffered and the relief demanded,
in addition to the infringed-upon right.102 She may not claim
anything if she fails to identify the damage endured and the
reasonably requested reparation, even if she in fact holds the
entitlement invoked.
Ordinary language supports, to some extent, a divide between
the terms "claim" and "right." Parties normally assert or stake a
claim. 103 In contrast, they seek to vindicate or enforce a right.104
This usage suggests that the underlying acts differ from each other.
In sum, judges may consistently categorize a claim as derivative
or direct based on whether the entitlement, the injury, and the
remedy pertain collectively to the corporation or individually to the
stockholders. Of course, this approach would not render the
analysis any easier. Nonetheless, it would lead the judiciary to
focus on all of the relevant factors and to deal with hard cases more
sensibly.
The facts in Feldman v. Cutaia105 help illustrate the point.
Feldman directly challenged the validity of certain stock options,
which two managing directors and the general counsel of Telx had
received in 2004 and exercised upon the corporation's merger into
GI Partners in 2006.106 He evidently contended that the
compensation plan took full effect in 2006 and that, at the time, it
102. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a "statement of the claim"
must include a "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and "a demand for
the relief sought." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The entitlement to relief rides on the
existence and the violation of a right.
103. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 414 (3d ed. 2002) (defining "claim" as "a calling on
another for something due or supposed to be due."). But cf. id. (defining "claim"
as "a privilege to something: right ... specifically: a title to a debt, privilege, or
other thing in the possession of another."); see also id. at 131 (defining "assert"
as "to demonstrate the existence of.").
104. See id. at 1955 (defining "right" as "something to which one has a just
claim" and as "something that one may properly claim as due"); see also id. at
2553 (defining "vindicate" as "to protect from attack or encroachment: preserve,
defend.").
105. 951 A.2d 727 (Del. 2008).
106. Id. at 729-30.
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only could have injured the investors and called for indemnification
in favor of them, inasmuch as Telx had ceased to exist. 107
Under Tooley, Feldman should have prevailed. On the one
hand, he had shown that the contested measure would exclusively
harm the individual stockholders, if anybody. 08 On the other hand,
he had demonstrated that any redress would have to go to them. 09
The Delaware Supreme Court merely affirmed the Court of
Chancery's ruling "that the alleged harm" in 2006 was "the same as
the Company would have suffered [in 2004] from the invalidity of
the Challenged Stock Options."" 0 Accordingly, if the first injury
readily qualified as derivative in light of Telx's full existence then,
so must have the second, fundamentally identical injury. "In order
to state a direct claim," the justices insisted, "the plaintiff [would
have had to endure] some individualized harm not suffered by all of
the stockholders at large.""'
This argument, at the very least, begs the question: If the board
had an obligation to revoke the invalid stock options prior to
approving the 2006 merger, would a violation not have inflicted
damage upon, and demanded a remedy for, the investors? If so, the
corresponding claim would have qualified as direct under Tooley.
Certainly, the trial judge might have found that the directors
actually had no such duty, that no infringement or harm had taken
place, or that the stockholders deserved no reparation. He might
have even concluded that Feldman was simply rehashing, in the
context of the 2006 merger approval, a prior contention about the
2004 stock options plan. These findings would have undermined the
claim on the merits, yet they would not have transformed it from
direct into derivative.
Moreover, a hypothetical controversy in which the directors
granted the stock options as the last step in a previously endorsed
merger would not essentially differ from the actual dispute.
Nonetheless, it would render the Delaware Supreme Court's reasons
completely inoperative. In particular, the justices would have to
concede that their jurisprudence had led them to a dead end.
Consequently, tribunals should construe a claim like that in
Feldman as derivative because it rests on a genuinely collective
entitlement held by the corporation and by the stockholders as a
whole. Whether this collectivity subsists after the dissolution of the
107. The Delaware Supreme Court reports that Feldman alleged "that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties by not reconsidering the validity of
the Challenged Stock Options before approving the Merger agreement." Id. at
730.
108. Id. at 728-30.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 730.
111. Id. at 733.
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corporation, at least for purposes of litigation, bears on the
enforceability but not on the nature of the right. In general, the
disappearance of the real party in interest does not render her
representative in court the holder of her entitlements, even though
it may forestall any vindication thereof.
Under the extraordinary circumstances of Feldman, the type of
right invoked runs counter to and ultimately trumps the other
criteria, viz., the locus of the injury and the beneficiary of the relief.
Otherwise, these three parameters normally point in the same
direction. In any event, the judiciary may rely on the second and
third parameters when in doubt with respect to the first one.
Of course, if the case law were to follow the suggestion
submitted at the end of Part II and shift away from the burdensome
pleading requirements imposed on derivative suits, it would reduce
the significance of this entire distinction. Courts would tend to go
into the merits straightaway. They would categorize the action as
derivative or direct mostly in order to decide how to allocate the
reparation.
As conceded earlier, the judiciary will probably keep compelling
plaintiffs to make much of their case already in the complaint. 112 In
all likelihood, it will also continue insisting that they "maintain
stockholder status in the corporate defendant throughout the
litigation." 1 3  Nonetheless, judges might be more open to the
proposed standard for distinguishing derivative from direct suits
because it would not in any way lower the bar for investors
purporting to sue derivatively.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
At the end of the day, grasping the difference between
derivative suits and shareholder class actions sheds light on what
collective rights are all about. Most fundamentally, one perceives
that a genuinely collective right differs from an aggregation of
discrete entitlements. A collective right belongs to the group, not to
the individual members.
Accordingly, a derivative suit involves the entitlements of the
corporation or of the collectivity of stockholders, not those of
individual investors who hold only an indirect interest. In contrast,
a shareholder class action turns on the individual rights of the
stockholders. It combines, for purposes of procedural efficacy, a
multiplicity of such entitlements, yet it does not thereby become an
authentically collective procedure.
112. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
113. Feldman, 951 A.2d at 731 (citing Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040,
1046 (Del. 1984)).
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Of course, the temptation to reduce a collective right to a
multiplicity of individual entitlements stems, in part, from the
desire to avoid reifying the collectivity. A corporation or a group of
stockholders does not exist in and of itself. Whoever attributes
rights to such an entity seems to be treating it, implicitly and
contradictorily, as existent.
However, the statement that derivative suits affect the
entitlements of the corporation or of the collectivity of investors does
not imply the existence of either in any paradoxical sense. It simply
entails that the corporation exists as a legal entity and as such holds
rights that the stockholders may vindicate derivatively. Such a
construct of law can boast no other kind of existence.
This insight illuminates collective entitlements more generally.
Thus, citizen suits concern the citizenry and its entitlements along
similar lines. Such a civic community possesses not only an
equivalent legal existence, recognized at the very least by the
statute that authorizes the action, but also rights, which its
members may exercise on its behalf.114 In the pharmaceutical air
contamination example invoked in Part II, the society as a whole
exists in this sense, and a local activist enforces its environmental
entitlements.
Certainly, one need not postulate a metaphysically bizarre
communal entity in order to speak of collective entitlements that
pertain to a group rather than to its members. One merely has to
acknowledge that people may create an institution, such as a
corporation, club, town, or state, which may hold rights that
indirectly benefit them but that do not belong to them. Frequently,
the process of creation unfolds less formally-as with
neighborhoods, ethnicities, or nations-and legal recognition may
take place ex post facto.115
114. For example, § 4911 of the 1972 Noise Control Act expressly authorizes
the use of citizen suits in federal court for air noise control violations. See
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a) (2006) ("[A]ny person (other than
the United States) may commence a civil action on his own behalf ... against
any person .. . who is alleged to be in violation of any noise control
requirement . . . . The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy, to restrain such
person from violating such noise control requirement . . . .").
115. The communal entity, whether formally or informally created, must
simply meet the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequate representation in order to attain recognition as class. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(a). If it shows that "the party opposing [it] has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class" in violation of its rights, it may
request "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
23 advisory committee's note (1966 amendment) (explaining that subdivision
(b)(2) "is intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused
to take action with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or
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Furthermore, the enforcement of collective rights does not
preclude the vindication of individual rights. In fact, the two unfold
independently of, even though they may interrelate with and
impinge upon, each other. For example, a derivative suit to prevent,
as corporate waste, a massive bonus for directors would run
separately from a shareholder class action to force the distribution
of certain overdue dividends, although it may affect the amount of
money available for such payments. Similarly, a citizen suit to stop
a chemical plant from polluting the air would proceed apart from,
but would most likely bear upon, a class action by the neighbors
seeking reparation for the depreciation of their property.
Finally, the implementation of group rights need not operate
oppressively vis-A-vis the members and their entitlements. As just
observed, it involves a different and independent set of rights, which
do not belong to the members in the first place. All the same, the
exercise of such entitlements may undermine the collectivity's
autonomy and, therefore, calls for special judicial control.
In a derivative suit, for instance, the plaintiff enforces the
corporation's rights, not her own or those of other stockholders.11 6
Nonetheless, the court must ensure that she properly represents the
corporative entity in a legitimate act of participatory democracy. It
must limit her participation in corporate decision making to matters
open to stockholder direct engagement and otherwise prevent her
from neutralizing the duly designated board.
In a citizen suit, the complainant likewise vindicates the rights
of the society as a whole rather than her own or those of her fellow
citizens,117 as in the previously cited pharmaceutical example. The
tribunal must guarantee, however, that she appropriately acts in
participatory and democratic representation of the citizenry. It
must rely on its own judgment, and on the authorities' input, in
order to keep her from hampering the work of the political branches
of government.
In both cases, however, the judiciary should avoid granting the
democratically elected representatives a prerogative to speak for the
collectivity. It should appreciate the value and legality of
alternative modes of representation, whether within the corporation
of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with
respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate").
116. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(a); see also Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004) ("[The derivative suit] enables a
stockholder to bring suit on behalf of the corporation for harm done to the
corporation. Because a derivative suit is being brought on behalf of the
corporation, the recovery, if any, must go to the corporation."); Levine v. Smith,
591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) ("A shareholder derivative suit is a uniquely
equitable remedy in which a shareholder asserts on behalf of a corporation a
claim belonging not to the shareholder, but to the corporation.").
117. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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or society as a whole. Litigation should go forward so long as the
litigants meet the basic statutory or regulatory prerequisites, even if
the pleadings do not demonstrate a clear conflict of interest or a
manifest incapacity on the part of the official decision-makers.
On this front, citizen suits might lead derivative suits toward
even more openness. The former, as opposed to the latter, do not
require the plaintiff to establish, whether in the complaint or at
trial, that office holders have compromised themselves. 118 Ideally,
derivative suits might follow citizen suits down this path and end up
taking a similar approach.
As a result, the complainant in a derivative suit would not need
to show that the directors lack independence. She would only have
to confirm that she offered them the opportunity to file the action
themselves. Such a confirmation would operate to some extent like
a showing of exhaustion of administrative remedies in a citizen suit
against a governmental agency. 119
Subsequently, the court would pass on the appropriateness of
the board's refusal. It would thereby consider whether further
litigation would serve the corporation's best interests. Finally, the
judicial focus would turn to the merits of the derivative claim.
In citizen suits, of course, the government benefits not only from
its usually superior financial resources and expertise in the defense
of the public interest but also from certain procedural advantages.
It must normally receive notice prior to litigation,120 in addition to a
copy of any proposed consent decree. 121 The authorities may then
118. See supra notes 18, 21-22, 111 and accompanying text.
119. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1881) ("[Blefore the
shareholder is permitted in his own name, to institute and conduct a litigation
which usually belongs to the corporation, he should show .. . that he has
exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation
itself, the redress of his grievances, or action in conformity to his wishes."); see
also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ("Hence, the demand
requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 exists at the threshold, first to insure that a
stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a
safeguard against strike suits. Thus, by promoting this form of alternate
dispute resolution, rather than immediate recourse to litigation, the demand
requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that directors manage
the business and affairs of corporations.").
120. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9659(d)(1), (e) (2006).
121. See, e.g., Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(3) (2006) ("No consent
judgment shall be entered in an action brought under this section in which the
United States is not a party prior to 45 days following the receipt of a copy of
the proposed consent judgment by the Attorney General and the
Administrator... ."); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (2006) ("No
consent judgment shall be entered in an action in which the United States is
not a party prior to 45 days following the receipt of a copy of the proposed
consent judgment by the Attorney General and the Administrator.").
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intervenel 22 or object to any such decree. Moreover, they may
request dismissal if they are already "diligently prosecuting an
action" on the matter. 123
In the context of derivative suits, the board presently enjoys
many of these procedural benefits, along with others. It ordinarily
has a right to notification in the form of a demand on it by the
person intending to sue. 124 Additionally, the corporation joins the
action as a defendantl 25-as do the directors, if the complaint stakes
a claim against them. The corporate leadership therefore
participates in the proceedings, as well as in any settlement
negotiations. Furthermore, it may move to dismiss the complaint by
invoking its own ongoing diligent prosecution elsewhere,126 which
would justify the rejection of an additional identical suit and,
consequently, terminate the complainant's "legal ability to initiate a
derivative action."127 Finally, at any point prior to the trial, "an
independent committee possesses the corporate power to seek the
termination of a derivative suit."12 8
Conversely, citizen suits could evolve too by drawing on the
experience with derivative actions. Most conspicuously, they might
take a page from the latter with respect to standing. This issue has
generated considerable controversy in the literature on citizen
suits.129
122. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(g).
123. See, e.g., id. § 9659(d)(2).
124. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
126. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch. 1980) ("The
stockholder's right to litigate is secondary to the corporate right to bring suit
only for so long as the corporation has not decided to refuse to bring suit.").
127. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784 ("A demand, when required and refused (if not
wrongful), terminates a stockholder's legal ability to initiate a derivative
action.").
128. Id. at 785; see also id. at 788 ("After an objective and thorough
investigation of a derivative suit, an independent committee may cause its
corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss in the Court of Chancery.").
129. See generally, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1505 (2008); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223, 229 (1988); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational
Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL.
L. REV. 315 (2001); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States:
How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for
Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239 (1999); Cass R.
Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1434 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing
and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988).
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A citizen suit presently demands an "injury in fact," requiring
that "the party seeking review be himself among the injured."o30 In
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,131 the
United States Supreme Court explained that "requiring a particular
injury" entails "that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way."l32 In Bond v. United States,133 the justices
established the following: "It is not enough that a litigant 'suffers in
some indefinite way in common with people generally."' 13 4
Derivative suits, in contrast, rest on the assumption that the
complainant does not have a personal stake in the underlying group-
claim. If she did, she would be asserting, at best, an aggregation of
individual claims. Accordingly, she would need to file a direct
action, or perhaps a shareholder class action.
In a genuinely collective suit, the plaintiff does not and cannot
have an individual interest. Therefore, judges should not demand
that she show the opposite. They should simply ask her to
demonstrate that the collectivity has a cognizable claim to which she
will do full justice.
In sum, derivative and citizen suits may jointly contribute to
clarifying the nature and the inner workings of group entitlements.
They may ultimately transform and improve themselves based on
such clarification. At the end of the day, other collective actions
might equally profit from the new insights.
130. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
131. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
132. Id. at 1442 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,
n.1 (1992)).
133. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011).
134. Id. at 2366 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)
(decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon)).
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